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obert Louis Stevenson once wrote that idleness is not the absence of activity but all those activities (more or less productive, laborious and industrious) that the ruling class does not recognize as such.
1 I will try to show that art and the market, in spite of their self-awareness, maintain the same relationship that according to Stevenson exists between leisure and work. Paraphrasing the Stevensonian adage, one will be able to say that art is not an activity removed from profit, nor is it necessarily manifested in a series of objects that have no economic utility or value: it is instead the set of activities and artifacts that the ruling class considers, at least symbolically, as excluded from the ordinary economic regime. Conversely, the market is not the metaphysical place in which the relationship to things is defined by the possibility of profit, but the space in which we build an aesthetic relationship with the world and things, but without it being perceived as such.
In a major study that has suggested we note the aesthetic foundation of every social reality, and has founded social aesthetics, 2 Barbara Carnevali had already shown how the separation and mutual autonomy of aesthetics and economics are the result of eighteenth-century epistemological myths, including that of the separation between the beautiful and the useful, which twentieth-century design and the avant-garde would then question. 3 Extending and deepening Carnevali's insight in a different direction from social aesthetics, I would like to show that aesthetics and economics can coincide because art and the market share a common metaphysical basis.
This common metaphysical basis is not only that which is expressed by the fact that works of art represent a quantitatively small yet economically very important, portion of the mass of goods that are manufactured, distributed and traded: of course, works of art are also the object of trade, but the proximity between art and the market is much more profound than that measurable by the fact that paintings, sculptures, artists' installations and artifacts are fated to be acquired and sold. In at least three spheres in fact, art and the market not only are not opposed, but the former is the condition of possibility and expression of the latter. In branding, advertising, and commerce the production of a sensible order is what makes possible and gives form to the market, and vice versa economic behavior is resolved in the more or less accomplished exercise of a specific artistic discipline.
Branding, advertising and the architecture of the store are in themselves applied arts and in each of these, artistic practices already recognized as such by the system of "fine arts" (the ready-made, the museum, and myth) are reconfigured, reappropriated, applied in various forms. But far beyond their nature as artistic disciplines, these spheres permit seamless connection between exchange and aesthetic experience, trade and sensible pleasure. In them, the market shows iself as practice of aestheticization of the real. Conversely, the art in them is not the sphere of practice inasmuch as subtracted from the logic of utility and profit, but is what makes possible that which today we call the market: the posture of the free collective assessment of things, the possibility of establishing values from the free meeting of desires and the world and not from the essence of the things or the whim of an individual.
More specifically it is in branding that the market coincides with a practice of purely aesthetic symbolization of the identity and economic-financial reality of goods and companies: a company, its capital, its history, but also the set of goods and services it produces and distributes is focused entirely in a visible symbol. Conversely a number of colors, strokes, typeface characters must express and condense a complex economic and financial reality. In the store the abstract and metaphysical entity of the market is translated production, and circulation of material objects establish a world. I will implicitly claim that the production and the circulation of works of art and of commodities cannot be considered as purely social phenomena, but should be regarded as cosmological processes. 3 For a detailed historical analysis of the relationship between aesthetics and economics in the last century see the major study of Frederic J. into sensible and material fact, made of stone, glass, color, spaces, shapes. The store is the symbolic form of the market, the place where it becomes both abstract and material reality, the perfect union of sense and matter, of structure and superstructure, of reality and imagination. Advertising, finally, shows that our relationship with the most various economic realities (businesses, goods, stores, services) is never immediate nor purely material or "commercial," but requires a sensible representation of them, an artistic reworking, in which they reveal not so much and not only their utility and their value, but the most common and deepest set of desires and dreams of which they are incarnation and symptom. In advertising the relation to the commodity-thing coincides with an ironic and constantly changing relation to the myth and stereotypes that define the common feeling of a civilization. These three spheres of coincidence are not random, and are not even the pathological effect of the deformation of art nor the cancerous proliferation of late capitalism. In order to be exchanged and circulate from hand to hand the everyday objects we call goods need to establish themselves as aesthetic realities: we need to aestheticize the world around us to be able to make it disposed to trade. Vice versa, to circulate objects means subjecting them to the taste of others: not only to worry about their appearance, but also and above all to recognize in the wishes and preferences of others (and not the nature of things or one's own will) the determination of their value.
To recognize a common metaphysical and anthropological basis in which art and the market, aesthetics and economics, coincide spontaneously and naturally, means to reject the clichés that more than one tradition have accumulated and continue to accumulate under the title of commodification or aestheticization. 4 Advertising, branding, and the architecture of the store are not forms of a "technocracy of sensibility at the service of the appropriation of extraneous labor or at the service of social and political domination," 5 precisely because the sensible nature of goods is not a deformation that "would permit to submit the real to logic and the process of economic evolution."
6 On the contrary, the aesthetic constitution of things and the world is the condition of their mise en commerce. Conversely, interest in the things we can appropriate and freedom in the definition of their value that the market assumes is the same cognitive and moral freedom that makes any aesthetic experience possible. 
BRaNdINg
From a strictly material point of view the origins of brands coincide with those of human culture: the use of signs, strokes, markings for the definition and the symbolic separation of property or the status of objects and people is a practice as old as the specific form of sociality which man gives rise to. Even the relation of mutual implication between brand and commerce is not an exclusive trait of capitalist economy: on the contrary, it is a phenomenon much older than one might suspect.
Criticizing anthropology and economic history's traditional assumption that natural goods such "as wheat, potatoes or cotton represent naturally homogeneous raw materials" and are therefore susceptible to being mechanically substituted, 7 Frank Faselow had shown that the introduction of brands is the first condition for the structuring of a complex market, different from that of the primitive bazaar. In an unstructured market (the bazaar) everything is uncertain: the true nature of the object for sale, its 'biography' (its origin, history, mode of production) and quality are not evident or immediately readable on the skin of the goods; the relationship to the object, therefore, and all the information about it, must be mediated by the seller. The introduction of brand names and trademarks primarily allows one to correct and balance "the asymmetry of information between the buyer and the seller" and to build a sort of shared cognitive map, by which the origin of the goods becomes identifiable, and their quality predictable. In this way not only "efficient channels of communication between producers and consumers, which are independent of the chain of intermediary traders and middlemen" 8 are produced, but the nature of competition in the market changes too, moving "from the relationship between buyer and seller to the relationship between sellers." 9 Again it is the symbolic marking of goods that transforms the market into a "public" space in which secrets become impossible, in opposition "to the excessive secretiveness of the bazaar which both grows out of and seeds suspicion. … Where the bazaar trader is obsessed with secrecy and with protecting business information on his sources of supply, the size of his inventory and of his clientele, the standardized commodity trader advertises his comprehensive range of stock, the producers from whom he purchases, and the size of his clientele." Mesopotamian civilization, but that the use of standardized sealed packaging has enabled the development of an economy where goods and work were easily replaceable. It is the brand that allows the establishment of an object as commodity; it is, in this sense, the attempt to solve "a paradox common to ancient and modern economies of scale: the reincorporation of homogeneous goods into a world of complex personal relationships" 12 or rather, "the realities of living in a community of individual actors formed and sustained through the circulation of impersonal objects."
13
It is at the end of the nineteenth century that brands as we know them today have their origin, but it is especially since the fifties that they acquire the importance that we commonly assign to them.
14 Contrary to popular belief, the brand gets to fully restructure the market just when consumption ceases to be defined solely by the desire to show off or to confirm one's social superiority or status (according to the logic of conspicuous consumption described by Veblen) or vice versa from the desire to Bovaristically reproduce that of the upper classes (Tardian social mimicry). 15 Only when consumption ceased to be defined by socially determined variants did it become necessary to associate a product with a variety of extremely complex meanings, values and emotions, of which the brand is both seal and ultimate signifier. 16 Precisely because the relations that push individuals to produce, purchase, and use items, especially certain objects rather than others, are much more complex and much deeper, 17 the symbolic trait through which the object lets itself be known and recognized not only acquires more importance, but must convey much more information than before. For this reason, starting from this moment, the brand will not only limit itself to structuring the market and rendering possible the flow of information between buyers and sellers in a more balanced way. It will above all disseminate, endow the object with a much wider quantity of meaning and sense than it did in the past. The brand is no longer "the label employed to differentiate among the manufacturers of a product," but becomes "a complex symbol that represents a variety of ideas and attributes."
18 It is through this sensible symbol that things speak. And through this self-image every commodity coincides with a "public image. The implications of these seemingly banal observation are enormous: to enable the structuring of a complex market neither the mere presence of physical objects, including the physical, psychological and social factors that led to their production (the desire to produce and the imagination invested in the design of the object, the work, the industry etc.), nor the circulation of money are sufficient. Not even the desire on the part of the retailer to exchange goods, nor the dialectic of the desire to buy them with the buyer's disposition toward sacrifice. It is necessary that things, objects and services become sensibly recognizable through the brands, that transfigure not only their sensible appearance but their very ontological status. A thing does not become a commodity because labor is accumulated in it (and with the labor the reflected image of the social relations that permitted the labor) or through the singular event of the exchange. It is rather a series of sensible symbols that produce the marketability of an object and produce that symbolic (and not merely physical, concrete or economic) space which we call the market.
To say that it is through the brand that the market can be structured at a level of complexity higher than that of a more or less large collection of singular events involving exchange, means that it is only aesthetically that the market can exist and live. Without the brand, without these elements of aesthetic nature the market, the economic life of things cannot be structured properly. The economy exists only aesthetically. Brands, as Celia Lury has recently written, must be seen more than mere signs or symbols as true and proper media 20 : they are sensible realities within which exchange becomes possible. So, unlike what has been affirmed by a tradition that ranges from Aristotle to Simmel, it is not money 21 but the brand that is the element and the end of trades. In order to establish and structure itself-and exceed the threshold of existence of the bazaar-a market must operate and assume an aesthetic constitution of the world: the affixing of pure images of recognition different from the things themselves, their doubling in aesthetic signs (and not purely logical ones) is what will allow them to circulate freely from person to person.
When viewed on a global scale (and not on a single product) branding is a classification of objects, or groups of objects, of this world, made not through purely logical or social categories but through sensible, not mimetic nor purely linguistic signs, that once affixed on things, then allow everything to not only stand out from the rest of the produced and exchanged objects but also to convey a potentially endless and extremely complex series of socially shared meanings. It is not enough to just produce, distribute, sell or buy things: it is necessary to accompany goods with symbols, organize them, divide the real of the objects and the producers through these symbols, constitute the sensible appearance of the world through these visible signs. If this series of symbols permits the ordering of objects, and depending on these also the people who make them and those who buy them, this order has nothing divine or natural: is contingent and mobile, and must encourage the mobility and contingency of things, their circulation-namely the very sum of the effects that we call commerce. Assuming the activity of branding, therefore, the market reveals itself to be a form of primary aesthetic ordering, a sort of first cosmic categorization that allows for, on the one hand, a socialization of the world of things (which can pass from hand to hand and not remain tied to only one subject) and, on the other, for the liberation of things, able now to circulate without necessarily having to go through the mediation of a subject-person to constitute themselves as recognizable, appropriable and usable. The brand is what allows the thing to make itself known through itself.
Branding reveals that every market is a cosmological fact even before a social one. On the one hand the market is not a reality subsequent to the constitution of the world and society: it is what allows a society to build a world as mobile, produced reality, and not only as fact to contemplate and to know (the market is somehow also the prerequisite for things to be produced, and for produced things to be desired). The set of categories that accompany the structuring of the social body is aesthetic in nature and not logical: it is not just a name but a logo, a sensible reality; it is not a pure logical or semiotic reality but a non-analogical image that is added to the thing. Through branding, therefore, every society aesthetically (and not logically or linguistically) doubles the world to transform it into a set of produced things able to move from hand to hand and no longer a mere object of contemplation. If the mise en societé expects and implies a logical ordering of the real, the mise en commerce provides and entails an aesthetic display, an aesthetic constitution of the world and objects, a doubling and sensible ordering of them.
The coincidence of art and the market that the brand seals is important for at least two other reasons. It allows an expansion of the very idea of the aesthetic dimension of things, which no longer represents the sphere in which they are the object of contemplation, but the condition of possibility of their circulation. Second, in it the symbol shows a different statute from that which we are used to conferring on it. A brand is an incomplete symbol, because it is incapable of meaning on its own, and must every time lean on the thing itself to mean something and therefore complete its sense. Furthermore it represents a new relationship between thing and object: the commodity, inasmuch as inseparable from its brand, is the object that is defined by the symbol of itself, which is imprinted on it. Thanks to the brand, things are defined by their own aesthetic symbol.
sToRe
We usually consider the market through the category of abstraction. The abstraction is firstly physical and social: the arrival of the goods on the market requires the erasure of all traces of the production process and especially of labor and the social relations that have accompanied the manufacture, except in a symbolic, distorted, alienated form. The desire that animates the exchange and causes the transit of the object from one subject to another, moreover, enters the market only in the alienated and distorted form, once again abstract, of the exchange value, unable to correctly express its real use value-of which the market makes an abstraction. The exchange, finally, is itself a process of abstraction, bringing an object to separate and abstract from the subject that produced it (and has crystallized their work in it) and from the subject who possesses it, to enter the space of the market in an abstract way, and only through the mediation of money. It is money that is in effect the operator and the extreme form of this abstraction: it is value of abstract possession [abstrakter Vermögenswert], abstract first of all primarily from its material nature in the same way that the meaning of a word is abstract with respect to its material sound.
22
The emphasis on the processes of abstraction of which the market is the last horizon, has made us forget that next to them exist equally intense processes of embodiment and materialization, that allow this series of abstractions to exist. Everything that has been abstracted must find a sensible realization through which it is able to manifest itself as material reality. The market in this sense is not only the most extreme theater of economic and monetary abstraction: it is also and above all the set of processes through which these abstractions rediscover the concreteness of matter, incarnate again in the sensible world, invent the formula to become visible realities. The most striking example is the store, the necessary physical space where goods are gathered together, prepared for sale, but above all exhibited and displayed. For there to be exchange there has to be a space, a structure in and through which the goods become pure sensible fact: the store is the most basic form, the structure both spatial and metaphysical through which the market becomes eminent reality and almost exclusively sensible. 23 Inside, the aesthetic experience becomes economic action and economic rationality proves to be possible only when it is materially and irreparably embedded in an aesthetic experience.
Rather than seeing a simple necessity or a pathology of our relationship to things, we should understand what happens to things in a store. If commerce needs stores it is because an aesthetic constitution of things is required to enable their circulation: ordering the world in the store in a contingent and mobile way-trading with things-means to order it aesthetically and vice versa. The store is perhaps the only place in which objects exist as goods. Shopping has often been analyzed as a practice of the consumer but we have interrogated much less the nature of the store as a metaphysical place in which a certain aesthetic ordering of a series of objects is liable to make possible and facilitate their marketability, their becoming goods. If the brand equated the market with an aesthetic doubling of the reality of things, in the store, on the contrary, the object-commodity and the set of meanings that its brand and its form allows it to embody, is as if transformed into pure sensible fact, visible in the act of exhibition. So that something may constitute itself as goods, exhibition is necessary (though not sufficient): an aesthetic ordering of which the store is cause and structure. The exhibition of things in this space, though, their sensible intensification has an effect on them that can not be reduced to that which has been called exposure value [Ausstellungswert] or a showcase-quality [Schaufenster-Qualität] 24 : instead it confers on things a cosmogonic power (or in any case is based on this specific power of things). This is why it seems like each store can be confused with the institution of the museum, with important differences: it preserves and also transforms that which the museum puts into effect (it is a sort of Aufhebung of it).
In a museum the space for exhibiting artifacts has the primary task of arousing and intensifying a sensible, emotional, and intellectual experience regarded as an end: the exhibition's objective is the sensible and mental realization of the objects that are so to speak summarized and entirely absorbed by their sheer appearing. No use is possible, as is no interaction: the object will not integrate into the world of the life of any other subject and may not establish a personal biography. Having ended up in the museum, an object is condemned to exist in a sort of acosmic interval in which it does not live and does not die, separated from its use and its existence. The object is reified and dematerialized in the experience of exhibition and contemplation. The museum represents from this point of view the most complete structure of abstraction. A store is instead the device that must produce the opposite result: if the museum subtracts the object from the world, the store is what opens to the object all possible worlds. A store is not a catalog of possible worlds, but the opening to the objects of all the possible worlds of possible buyers. For this, the exhibition in a store does not have purely contemplative purposes and the material reality of the object is not summarized by its appearing: it must suggest a sketch of the world that the purchase of the object can liberate.
If the museum is a machine capable of producing a vacuum of the world, an acosmic interval in the mundane continuum of objects, actions, words and events, the store must condense into the objects that it exhibits the possible transformations that the surrounding world (and the worlds of life of the subjects who come into contact with the object) may undergo. It is not enough to exhibit in pure form all the properties and all the meanings of which the object is incarnation: it is a case of rendering visible the ways in which this object will structure the world and the sensible experience of the subject that will appropriate it. From this point of view a store is like a set of indeterminate and incipient cosmogonies that will bloom only when the object will have abandoned that threshold. Then again the store operates a strange cosmological inversion: a world is not that which precedes the group of objects, but the torsion that each object produces in a pre-existing world once it enters into contact with it.
The museum emphasizes and strengthens the autonomy of the object, its separation from the rest of the objects and subjects that make up the cosmos. The store is a space designed to make the object into the absolute of heteronomy: what the display must show is the ability to enter different worlds, or better, any possible world, not only adapting to each of them, but making each of them different and special. A store does not serve to isolate things from the world, but to produce an intermediary world and render possible their insertion into any individual world.
If the museum is a cave that promises enlightenment, the store remains paradoxically faithful to the Platonic myth: it puts the customer or the purchaser in the condition of exiting the cave, knowing that the real world is the one that opens up outside the store.
Lastly, if the museum embodies the space of public universality as opposed to private, the store seems an intermediary and hybrid space that redraws the topology of cohabitation. Not a wholly private space, because anyone can enter and the property is purely contingent, transitory. But it is not a public space either: there is no claim to universality, and no desire to give up individuality.
So that new objects can be continually produced, so that produced things can circulate, so that they are so desirable as to pass from hand to hand, it is necessary to make the world as a property and an emanation of the things themselves, something that we can appropriate and that is immediately communicable through their appearance. The store is the operator of this objectification (in the sense of reducing the world to the echo of an object) and multiplication and sensible constitution of the cosmos; through the store, the market coincides with this same operation of reduction and sensible intensification of the world.
adveRTIsINg
Advertising is perhaps the most extreme form of coincidence between art and the market: the experience of goods in this case is a purely aesthetic fact. In it economic activity coincides with the sensible sublimation of objects of everyday use and of the world of manufactured goods and services that surround us, in a sort of visual and conceptual transfiguration of everyday life in its totality. Goods are abbreviated in their image and the same image is the object of an aesthetic maniement of celebration and intensification without precedent. In advertising the market becomes discourse of the things on themselves, the space in which they try to coincide with their image and their appearance is a symbol of their desirability. The very existence of advertising, the need, real or imagined, of its presence for the ordinary course of economic life, would seem to show that the reality which we usually define as economic is produced thanks to this primary aesthetic experience.
We have not reflected sufficiently on the consequences of the fact that to exist the market needs a knowledge, a discourse, and an iconography concerning goods so radically different from the self awareness that economic science has of itself. It would be hard to imagine a more autonomous knowledge, from a rhetorical, epistemological, and even material point of view. Produced by different subjects according to profession, competence, and training from those who produce and popularize economic science, advertising is stylistically and epistemologically much closer to the ancient Renaissance literature of emblems and enterprises than any university treatise; and it has the tendency to exist in other media and in other material contexts than other discourses on goods, value, money. Advertising, moreover, contradicts almost all of the principles of the dogmatic classical economics from which it distinguishes itself by the fact it develops a deeper, but also more hyperbolic and obsessive discourse. Advertising discourse operates on a deeper level of the same reality of economic facts, because it must anticipate and almost provoke the actions of consumers: it is not an innocent description of events but the cause of the reality of which it speaks. Precisely for this reason it tends to transfigure it, to the point of not being able to ever fully realize itself in the act that it provokes: in advertising discourse the dreamed relationship is expressed, not the actual practice of consumption. It makes it so that the center of economic dynamics are not money, work, exchange, or desire for gain, but the image of things, their appearance, their beauty, the set of shared meanings condensed by the brand. Advertising transforms the market into something at the center of which are wishes, dreams, and images.
Itself a minor or applied art, advertising not only helps to make an aesthetic reality of goods, but changes the very social and anthropological statute of the practice of art as such. From the start, it has proclaimed itself as the art able to take its leave from the set of romantic ideals: that of the autonomy of artistic practice, of the sublime character of the work of art, of its opposition to any form of economy. 25 But it is above all the very notion of aesthetic value (or of the ideal of beauty) that advertising art challenges. As an art form entirely and irreparably oriented to its user it "involves a regard for the subjectivity of the receiver" to the point that in it the value "is established only in the relationship with the observer and their way of observing." 26 Advertising is the applied art that has renounced every form of ideal of beauty or of absolute and not contingent values: it is the art that is born from the assumption that "beauty comes only from the mutual relationship between the object and its recipient." 27 Its purpose is in fact precisely the construction of a purely contingent value, that which taste can welcome and establish each time. Not only does the work of art have nothing exclusive with regards to the other objects, but the value of any object, regardless of its nature, can change entirely arbitrarily. If anything can be a work of art, every art object can assume any value according to a special aesthetic treatment of which advertising is the paradigm. It is this ability to constitute an aesthetic devoid of any form of axiological absolute that makes advertising a central aesthetic experience not only for commerce but for the entire aesthetic sensibility and culture of the last century. And its sovereign axiological indifference is not a secondary element, but the very heart of the aesthetic advertising practice. Advertising is the place where aesthetic value and economic value find the formula of their mutual equivalence: the economic value of a commodity is expressed aesthetically and the sensible manifestation of things becomes the foundation of their economic life.
The reasons for this coincidence are profound. In advertising, economy and aesthetics identify the sole cause and the sole place of the constitution of value (economic and aesthetic) in taste, in all its contingency and its variability. Advertising thus transforms the market into a huge "organ of collective taste," through which a community selects and builds collectively its own cultural and cosmic identity and takes collective decisions on its present and its past. 28 One could say that in advertising the market is transformed into a form of metasymbolic reflexivity that in contemporary civilization has a similar and inverse function to that which, according to Levi-Straussian anthropology, totemism performs in Amerindian cultures. 29 The market becomes a form of metasymbolism because it does not limit itself to producing symbols of things or to transforming their sensible appearance, but develops a metalinguistic discourse on the very symbolism belonging to things, on the meaning that it is possible to assign to each of the produced and traded goods. And it is a form of reflexive symbolism, because unlike totemic symbolism, in which the association of a meaning with a specific element in the world is carried out by the social unconscious, in this case the discourse of things is self-aware and speaks of itself. It is, finally, an ironic metasymbolism, able to change values and associations with variable pace and which conceives and shapes value as the true nature of contingency. Advertising (and the market in it) is the plane of ironic construction and destruction of the social categories -a sort of aesthetic de generatione et corruptione of a society's symbolism. The economy becomes the constant invention of new symbolic configurations, ironic factory of symbols that things must be able to embody, as if they were the real actors of the social stage.
coNclusIoN
If the analysis of the real forms of coincidence between art and the market is important, it is above all because it allows us to observe and define the nature of the relationship that binds us to things and to their lives, beyond the categories with which social sciences interpret the real. It is not enough to state that the market is a portion of the aesthetic world and vice versa that aesthetics are an integral and essential part of the infinite series of operations conducted on things and through things that we call the economy. It is not enough to state that aesthetics founds the possibility of circulating things because it constitutes their desirability.
In reality, when viewed from the perspective of the three spheres of branding, advertising, and the store, that which, in recent centuries we have called the market proves to be not only the space of negotiation and exchange of goods and money: it is the first form of aesthetic categorization of the material and social world. The market exists only because the value is image and not substance, and because it is the image that defines and makes possible the desirability and the circulation of things. In the same way, commerce is not only a relationship to things mediated by money: it is the form that society has invented to build a world in which the relationship between things and people is defined by an aesthetic mediation at the center of which is contingency. Unlike what a certain tradition has thought, commerce does not define the subtraction of things in general from the community, but on the contrary that which makes possible, at least virtually, an infinite socialization of them. Vice versa, commercialization is one of the forms of the constitution of things in general in a world ordered together aesthetically and not only logically.
From this point of view commerce and the market are not an accidental and secondary activity and the institution of a society able to establish itself without them, but the means by which the non-separation between society and the world of things is built. The market has become in recent years the operator and the space for the establishment of a universe of things that can make the world and of a society that defines itself primarily not by a mystical form of spontaneous solidarity nor by some identity but that builds its own reality starting from the relationship with the world of things.
The discovery of a common metaphysical basis also allows us to observe art from another point of view. There is an aesthetic that has always considered in an exclusive way those unique and irreplaceable objects, of absolute value, that aspire to last forever: it is that which has permitted us, over the most recent centuries, to maintain a traditional and extremely ancient idea of art. But for at least a century and a half-with the development of design and the intensification of industrial production-there has developed an aesthetic of everyday objects, constitutively multiple, created to be consumed, to live in time and not in eternity and endowed with a value that changes according to the desire of men, fashions, seasons. Art, from this point of view, proves to be co-essential to that liberation of the values which makes the market possible. It is now that which makes a market possible, a space where the actors arrive and have no a priori on the value of things. The market is not only the space for the exchange or the repository for that which we produce and distribute. It is the place that is born from the decision that values are infinitely negotiable, never objective, fruits of an encounter and not established in advance, related to a taste and not to an objectivity or a nature. The market is the world in which the value of things is neither the pure will of subjectivity nor natural, ontological fact, but a result of the establishment of a necessarily collective taste and fashion. The market is this space of collective assessment. The fact that it has become ever larger, that everything has entered into the market, the it is only the market that is sacred and inviolable, simply means that no value surpasses the play of tastes: if everything by now is the object of art, it is also because no value can establish itself beyond the forms of fashion.
École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales
Translated by Daniel Lukes
